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 Political Islam and Europe 





The social, political and even economic power of moderate Middle East Islamists has been 
growing for a generation or so, but the phenomenon was not given the attention it deserved by 
outside observers and policy makers until the impressive recent electoral performances by Arab 
Islamists in Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco and, most recently, Bahrain. Earlier 
accomplishments at the polls by the Islamic Action Front in Jordan in 1989 and the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in Turkey in 2002, although signalling the importance of political 
Islam, did not establish its status as the pre-eminent oppositional political force in the region. 
Now that status cannot be disputed. As a result, the question of how to deal with Islamists who 
reject violence, embrace democracy and outperform their competitors at the polls has become a 
central concern not only of incumbent Middle East elites, but of interested foreign actors as well.  
For the European Union (EU) and its member states, the US and the governments of other 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the present political configuration in most Middle East and North African (MENA) countries 
presents a well-known and fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, they are uncomfortable both 
with the authoritarianism of most incumbents and with much of the content of Islamists’ beliefs 
and policy preferences. On the other hand, they are comfortable with the semi-secular policies 
of most incumbents and with moderate Islamists’ apparent embrace of democratic processes. 
Hence the question these foreign governments confront is how to square the circle in their 
dealings with MENA countries, ruled over by authoritarians with (at least, nominally) 
acceptable policies but unacceptable methods and challenged by Islamists whose democratic 
methods are acceptable but many of whose policy preferences sometimes seem to be inimical to 
Western interests and beliefs. The purpose of this volume has been to begin to explore ways in 
which this dilemma might best be resolved.  
Because relatively little is known about the attitudes and opinions of moderate Islamists and 
because most have yet to establish track records in government, this investigation has focussed 
on them, leaving aside questions concerning the beliefs and behaviour of the semi-secular 
incumbent MENA elites and, for that matter, of Western political elites as well. Recognising 
then that this is a first step in seeking information for addressing the dilemmas posed to Western 
governments by authoritarian incumbents and apparently democratic Islamist challengers, it 
nevertheless provides a useful introduction to understanding the relevant views of moderate 
Islamists. This information can in turn assist in evaluating the costs and benefits to concerned 
parties in the West of entering into dialogue with Muslim democrats; in understanding how such 
a dialogue might best be structured; and in anticipating realistic expectations of any dialogue 
that might occur. 
In order to accomplish these objectives the contributors to the volume were instructed to utilise 
a standard protocol for their investigation of Islamism within the country of their concern. The 
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subjects of focus in the protocol were the evolution of Islamism and the views of Islamists on 
several related issues, including political reform, democratic models, EU foreign policy, and 
areas of potential collaboration and difference with Europe. The findings reported in the various 
chapters are thus sufficiently comparable both to discern differences between countries and to 
formulate empirically-based generalisations about Islamism within the MENA generally. The 
purposes of this chapter are to do just that, as well as to draw out the implications of these 
empirical findings for a potential dialogue with Europe. To do this the chapter will first identify 
empirical regularities and differences across the case studies. It will then take up some issues 
that the data do not address or provide insufficient bases upon which comparative observations 
can rest. It will then shift to a consideration of the costs and benefits of engagement with 
Islamism. Finally, it will conclude with some recommendations as to how a dialogue might best 
be conducted. 
1.  Who are the Muslim Democrats? 
Muslim democrats consist of those movements and organised political parties that have either 
rejected violence and radicalism or restricted its application to what they see as efforts to 
achieve national liberation; or have evolved from being politically passive and focused on 
encouraging personal religiosity and/or providing social services, into being political activists. 
Many of them are former exiles, who have returned to their native countries following previous 
confrontations with incumbent regimes. In some cases movements and organisations of Muslim 
democrats combine these different backgrounds, having formerly been supporters of political 
violence and in other periods having operated primarily in exile.   
All of the Muslim democrats under study, with two exceptions, are national Islamists in that 
their political focus is on their own nation-state, where they are seeking through democratic 
means to exercise political power. The two exceptions are Hamas and Hizbollah, which are 
more correctly thought of as Islamist liberation movements in that the primary stimulus for their 
creation and for much of their present raison d’être has been confrontation with an occupying 
power. These two parties have also not completely and absolutely eschewed the use of violence 
in the domestic politics of Palestine and Lebanon, respectively. They can possibly be thought of 
as Muslim democrats, however, because they have accepted the rules of democratic contestation 
in their respective national settings and are not substantially more inclined to violence than 
other political actors with whom they are competing.  
The long political journey of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB, or Muslim Brothers) illustrates 
the tortuous path followed by many Muslim democrats, which is hardly surprising given that the 
leading organisations in most Arab countries are either national organisational offshoots of the 
MB or were inspired by it. It commenced essentially as a social movement dedicated to personal 
spiritual regeneration and social service provision in Egypt in 1928. As the anti-British struggle 
intensified in the post-war era, the MB was both politicised and radicalised, with its armed wing 
entering into guerrilla combat in the Suez Canal zone against the British and its secret 
underground organisation engaging in assassination of leading Egyptian political figures. 
Accused of plotting against Nasser in 1954 after it had been afforded special political status by 
the Free Officers who sought to use its power to bolster their own, the MB was crushed.  
Upon Nasser’s death in 1970 his successor, Anwar al Sadat, commenced almost immediately to 
court the MB as a counterweight to the then powerful left. But as Sadat’s domestic political 
position deteriorated following his trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, he began to clamp 
down on all forms of autonomous political activity, including that by the Muslim Brotherhood.  
The same scenario of a new regime courting popularity through a political liberalisation played 
itself out under President Mubarak, who, succeeding Sadat in 1981, let MB members and other 
political figures out of jail and permitted the MB to run for elections in alliance with the Wafd 
Party in 1984, despite the fact that it was not allowed to register as a political party. Since that POLITICAL ISLAM AND EUROPE | 5 
 
time the MB has increased its political presence, although in zigzag fashion as the regime has 
alternated between allowing it political space and cracking down on it. It steadfastly refused to 
be drawn into the early 1990s insurgency led by the more radical Islamist organisations, chief of 
which were Islamic Jihad and Gama`a Islamiyya, but this did not prevent the regime from 
accusing it of so doing and harassing it in various ways. The combination of its political 
experience gained through electoral campaigns and membership in parliament, along with its 
solid membership base, enabled it to win 88 seats in the 454 member parliament in the 2005 
elections, a remarkable achievement in the face of voter intimidation and general electoral fraud 
perpetrated by the regime.  
In sum, the Egyptian MB at various stages in its almost 80-year history has manifested virtually 
all forms and stages of Islamist political organisation. In its early period it was politically 
passive, focused instead on personal behaviour and social services. It then became politically 
engaged and was swept up in anti-colonial and internal violence. Crushed by Nasser and then 
revived by Sadat, who permitted its leading members to return to the country, it definitively 
turned its back on political violence in the 1970s and has sought since then to build its capacities 
to compete for power within that political space the regime allows. It has used its influence in 
recent years to impact policies, especially in the cultural sphere. It has provided inspiration for 
numerous other Islamist movements and its trajectory to non-violent, democratic participation 
has no doubt served as a model for many of them.  
Whatever the particular path MENA Islamist organisations have followed to arrive at their 
present state of Muslim democrats, their moderation is now comprised of several different 
components. First, they renounce violence against domestic actors, although not against Israel in 
the case of Hizbollah and Hamas, organisations which also maintain significant coercive 
capacities that have direct relevance to the internal politics of Lebanon and Palestine, 
respectively. So by this measure the status of Hizbollah and Hamas as Muslim democrats is 
somewhat ambiguous and will remain so unless and until at a minimum they absolutely and 
unequivocally renounce the use of violence in domestic politics and take practical steps to 
implement that policy. Whether or not a renunciation of violence against Israel is also required 
for them to be dubbed Muslim democrats is a much more complicated matter and involves 
considerations of international law and foreign policy that are beyond the scope of this paper.  
Second, these parties and movements have engaged directly in democratic practices, especially 
elections, although it is probably also true to say that they would not reject other paths to power, 
such as through co-optation by the military. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that their 
political manoeuvring is intended to make them suitable partners for politically beleaguered 
militaries and security forces that might one day find themselves in need of such allies. Still, 
this scenario, which was acted out in Egypt in the 1952-54 interregnum and for some period of 
time after the Umar al Bashir coup in 1989 in the Sudan, seems less likely than a democratic 
scenario in most national settings. For one thing, Islamists have learned through the experiences 
of Egypt and Sudan that a Faustian bargain with the military is fraught with peril. For another, 
Hamas has recently demonstrated that electoral victory is possible; while Hizbollah has shown 
that even minority participation in government as a result of electoral performance provides 
substantial benefits. The Turkish case of the Justice and Development Party assuming the reins 
of power is also instructive. For Muslim democrats to throw away their chances of exercising 
governmental power through the ballot box in favour of a short cut via an alliance with the 
military would suggest political despair, to say nothing of poor political judgement, neither of 
which seems to characterise contemporary Muslim democrats. 
Third, Muslim democrats are measured in their approach to Islamicisation. Unlike the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, the Muslim democrats of Turkey and the Mediterranean Arab world have been 
reasonably cautious in their efforts to spread Islamic practices, although there is considerable 
variation in how strident these efforts have been. In Palestine Hamas has explicitly renounced 
any desire or attempt at imposed Islamicisation, while Hizbollah has taken the position that 6 | ROBERT SPRINGBORG 
 
Lebanon is a pluralistic, multi-cultural society in which religious diversity must be respected. 
Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), despite its status as the third largest party in 
parliament, has not vociferously advocated measures to impose Islamic dress or other 
manifestations of religiosity. On the other hand, Egypt’s MB has used its presence in parliament 
to launch attacks on governmental actions that they deem to be too liberal or secular and have 
also sought through the courts to restrict personal freedoms that they deem to violate strict 
interpretations of Islam. Whether it and others like it would seek to impose Islamicisation if 
they were to attain power is an open question, but there are good reasons to suggest that they 
would not, chief among which are political calculations based on fear of backlash by both 
domestic and international political actors were they to do so. For Egypt, the presence of a 
Christian minority that comprises some 6-10% of the population and is actively supported 
internationally poses a further restraint.  
Fourth, some Islamists have demonstrated, at least at the elite level, a willingness to engage 
directly with non-Muslim international actors, such as democracy promoters from the US and 
the EU and its member states. In Egypt, for example, both the parliamentary and party 
leadership of the MB have worked with the Westminster Foundation’s project to strengthen 
various capacities of parliament. Similar cooperation has occurred in Morocco, whereas in 
Palestine Hamas has conveyed its willingness to work with Western governments, who have 
refused to reciprocate. While all Muslim democrats express reservations about involvement of 
European and North American actors in their respective political systems, this in no way 
differentiates them from most secular nationalist opposition figures or even from incumbent 
authoritarians, the latter of which typically condemn external support for non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and democratisation activities in general, but which have no qualms 
about themselves receiving various types of support from those same external actors.  
In addition to sharing a growing tendency towards moderation, the movements and political 
parties labelled here as Muslim democrats are also characterised by significant gaps between 
their leaders and followers, precisely because they are mass-based organisations. Unlike most of 
their secular and semi-secular competitors within political oppositions, which are typically 
coteries of elites without popular bases, or government-controlled and -created single parties 
which are loosely-knit patronage vehicles, Muslim democrats typically span the social order. 
Their leaders are normally educated professionals, while at the base they recruit successfully 
from among the petty bourgeoisie and even among the socially marginal, including unemployed 
and undereducated youths. It is not surprising, therefore, that within the same organisation a 
wide variety of different interests and outlooks exits.  
A key question (beyond the scope of this book) is how leaders of these movements and 
organisations retain the loyalty of their followers, for objectively their interests are not identical 
and socially they may inhabit and reflect quite different milieu. A common observation about 
moderate Islamist leaders is that they appear remarkably familiar with Western models and 
procedures and seem to have no difficulty in interacting with Westerners, even in their own 
languages. Presumably if asked about the reasons for the loyalty of their followers, these leaders 
would invoke explanations to the effect that they share common views of social, economic and 
political problems precisely because they are all committed Muslims. Leaving aside the issue of 
whether or not shared ideological commitment provides sufficient glue to bind together those of 
markedly different social backgrounds within a single political organisation, the question 
remains of how such coherence is created, maintained and acted upon operationally. Might it be 
middle level apparatchiks who provide key linkages between elites and the mass base? 
Alternatively, might it be that these Islamist organisations are comprised of coalitions based on 
pre-existing social units, with the organisational sinews thus linking the leaders of these social 
units, who in turn deliver their followers? 
Whatever the answer is to the query of how the gap between leaders and their followers is 
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more generally that Muslim democrats are under constant threat of being outflanked by 
extremists. Indeed, in virtually every country under study both moderate and radical Islamist 
organisations coexist. In the case of Egypt, for example, the dominant MB faces challengers on 
both the left and right flanks. On the former,  Islamic Jihad, Gama`a Islamiyya and a host of 
smaller organisations have track records of violence and uncompromising stands towards the 
government and its Western backers, even though some have in recent years renounced violence. 
On the right, al Wasat, as suggested by the very name - which means ‘the middle’ – is an 
attempt led by young political entrepreneurs to capture the political middle ground between the 
MB, on the one hand, and those who are less committed Islamists and even Christians, on the 
other. In Palestine, Islamic Jihad stands firmly on Hamas’ left flank, frequently refusing to 
honour ceasefires and other concessions that Hamas is willing to make. A similar relationship 
exists in Morocco between the establishment-oriented PJD and the more radical Justice and 
Charity. The history of the Islamist insurrection in Algeria cannot be told accurately without 
reference to the split between the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which gradually eschewed 
violence, on the one hand, and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), on the other, which intensified 
it. All Islamist organisations are banned in Syria, but the Syrian Muslim Brothers operating 
from exile are pursuing a moderate, non-violent line, while occasional acts of political violence, 
such as the attack on the US Embassy in 2006, suggest that radical underground Islamist 
organisations are not content with non-violent means to deal with their perceived enemies. In 
comparatively democratic Turkey the ruling moderate Islamist AKP has to be wary of the 
appeals of the considerably more radical Felicity Party. The fragmentation of both Sunni and 
Shi`a communities in Iraq into numerous Islamist political organisations, with some eschewing 
violence and others perpetrating it on a daily basis, is the extreme case that exemplifies the 
general trend. 
This evidence suggests that Muslim democrats do not have the Islamist political  field to 
themselves. Others who claim to be yet more democratic than they or, more typically, more 
effective because they have not ‘sold out’ by renouncing violence and accepting democracy, are 
present in virtually every country in the region. The relative strengths of moderates and radicals 
are determined in large measure by the contexts in which they operate. Probably the most 
common theme running through the recent history of these countries is that the radicals 
overplay their hand, inviting massive and successful retaliation by governments, leaving the 
ground clear for the moderates. This scenario played itself out in Syria in the early 1980s, in 
Egypt in the early 1990s, in Algeria later in that decade. In Turkey one can read the history of 
the last quarter century as one in which governmental repression of Islamists brought about their 
gradual moderation, leading ultimately to their successful assumption of governmental power in 
2002. It would be incorrect, however, to assume that history moves in a uni-linear, predictable 
fashion and that present contexts which by and large favour moderates will persist. The volatile 
situations in Lebanon and Palestine are possibly the most likely candidates for a return to 
conditions in which moderation is overwhelmed by violent approaches, but they are by no 
means the only possible candidates for such changes.  
That moderation is in significant measure a product of context and that radical organisations are 
for the most part still present, but sitting on the political sidelines presumably waiting for a 
return of conditions that will favour them rather than Muslim democrats, suggest the tenuous 
nature of the present conjuncture. Moderation has yet to be firmly institutionalised, which 
requires it not only to be incorporated into the political system and to be accepted by important 
external actors, it also requires accommodation and ultimate acceptance by other domestic 
political forces. Not even Turkey has yet met those preconditions, as many significant Turkish 
political actors still harbour ambitions of turning back the political clock to Kemalist secularism 
and evicting Islamists not only from government, but from the political and social systems more 
broadly. 8 | ROBERT SPRINGBORG 
 
It would hardly be surprising, therefore, if Muslim democrats were contingent ones. Threatened 
on their flanks by other Islamists, in the front by opposed governments and powerful foreign 
actors, and in the rear by the frailties of their own organisations, they naturally must feel 
compelled to keep all options open. Democracy is the preferred, but not the only option. They 
would be politically foolish to make their last stand for democratic principles when other actors 
in the system are violating them. It is thus vital that so long as democracy remains contingent in 
the mind of those who are in positions to help bring it about, that the conditions which nurture it 
are as favourable as possible. In the case of Islamist moderates, most have recently witnessed 
the heavy price paid by failed direct assaults on entrenched political power and have drawn the 
conclusion that compromise is preferable to ‘all or nothing’ approaches. But that situation 
cannot continue indefinitely if all paths to power appear irrevocably blocked, if only because 
Islamist radicals are already there to pick up the challenge. 
A final feature common to Muslim democrats observed in the chapters is that they do not see 
themselves as representing specific societal or economic interests. Indeed, the very concept of 
interest is inimical to them and, they would claim, to Islam itself. Good Muslims are, by 
definition, united, forming a society that is cohesive, fair and moral. The divisions that Islam 
sanctifies are between those who are Muslim and those who are not. Contemporary Islamists 
implicitly also distinguish between engaged and disengaged Muslims, that is, those who are 
committed to establishing Muslim social and political orders and those who are not. The task 
before them is thus to engage those Muslims, not to represent interests of specific classes, 
regions, ethnic or other group interests. Reflecting this orientation is the Islamist concern with 
moral issues in society, which takes the form of preoccupation with education, culture and the 
media. So, for example, in the 2000-2005 Egyptian parliament, the seventeen MB deputies 
devoted 80% of their interpellations, or questions to ministers, to matters concerning those 
issues, leaving a scant 20% for matters of economics, foreign and defence policies, and other 
vital governance issues.
1 
Materialists naturally find this argumentation to be both temporising and self-serving. In reality, 
according to them, Islamists can claim to be above the fray of politics that decides who gets 
what, how and when, only as long as they are not in government. So, presently, most Muslim 
democrats have the luxury of being all things to all people, not having to make hard choices on 
resource allocations while reinforcing claims to moral superiority by focusing on culture and 
education. But when and if they confront material reality, according to this view, they will have 
to reveal which interests they favour and which they ignore. This in turn will tend to fracture 
their political organisations and possibly bring about broader political realignments, with 
Islamists forging new coalitions with non-Islamists on the basis of interests rather than on the 
basis of moral convictions and claims. 
Islamists would naturally reject this reasoning and scenario, not only on philosophical grounds 
but possibly also by pointing out that Islam is generating a new calculus of interest, with Islamic 
banking and finances being but one manifestation of this re-ordering of the material according 
to Islamic precepts. They might also point to the Turkish case, where the AKP has in fact been 
in government for more than four years and if anything, appears to be as united and in a stronger 
political position than when it first swept into office, despite having had to wrestle with 
allocation issues.  
Resolution of these philosophical and empirical debates is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Suffice it to say here that Islamist democrats reject the epistemological foundations of Western 
political science and political economy, which prioritise the material over the spiritual and are 
sceptical of those who claim to be acting on moral grounds. The tests of whether or not 
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moderate Islamists can rise above specific material interests and maintain coalitions of Muslim 
wholes have yet to be undergone. With the partial exception of Turkey, Muslim democrats 
remain on the sidelines of MENA governance. In the case of Turkey it can be argued that 
countervailing forces have reduced both the AKP’s control of and perceived responsibility for 
public policy, so the Turkish test is yet to really commence. And one can also argue that in 
Turkey the AKP more clearly represents the interests of the independent small and middle 
bourgeoisie, especially its Anatolian core, so that it does indeed rest on a sold material base. But 
this is to prejudge the issue, for it cannot at this stage be resolved empirically. All that can be 
said with complete confidence is that there are profound differences between Western and 
Muslim political philosophies and that the views of each will colour the manner in which they 
would enter into and conduct dialogue with the other. 
In conclusion, these chapters reveal remarkable consistency about the nature of Muslim 
democrats, given that they are a political phenomenon present in so many different countries in 
the region. Their evolution, however, has followed similar patterns in those various countries, 
with the MB in Egypt not only having the longest such history of evolution, but serving as a 
model for Arab Muslim democrats elsewhere. Presently favoured by the historical conjuncture 
that has seen radicalism eclipsed, at least for the time being, Muslim democrats must 
nevertheless be cautious of their commitment to democracy, for the systems in which they 
operate are at best quasi-democratic and their challengers do not necessarily share such a 
commitment. Not having been called upon to formulate and implement public policies, the 
‘real’ nature of Muslim democrats remains – aside from the case of Turkey - untested. They 
themselves profess that the moral imperatives of Islam provide sufficient guide for public policy 
and establishing and maintaining a coherent, Muslim socio-political order, whereas many non-
Muslim observers remain sceptical of their ability to remain united in the face of the difficulty 
of reconciling competing material claims.  
2.  Muslim Democrats’ views of the EU 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Muslim democrats interviewed for this volume, with the partial 
exception of the Turks, appear to know little about EU policies, including the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). After all, 
EU policies are not particularly well-known to European audiences and those policies relevant 
to MENA countries have been negotiated almost exclusively on government to government 
bases. Other issues, such as the Lebanese war of 2006, the civil war in Iraq or the ongoing 
Israel-Palestine conflict, to say nothing of domestic political issues in the countries concerned or 
US policies towards the region, have all captured greater media and public attention than 
European policies, which seem in fact to have little impact on the ground. Thus Muslim 
democrats, like their fellow countrymen, have had few opportunities to learn about relevant EU 
policies, to say nothing of participating in their formulation.  
The impact of this lack of knowledge is that most Muslim democrats appear to evaluate the EU 
at a general perceptual level, rather than on an empirical basis. Not knowing what the EU has 
proposed to do vis à vis their country or what in fact it is doing, they report in general how they 
feel about the EU. Not surprisingly they say that they feel distant from the EU and its 
negotiations with their respective governments. Interestingly, this lack of engagement does not 
seem to translate into hostility. Most respondents report a generally favourable view of 
Europeans, European countries and the EU and would like to have more direct interactions with 
them. In some cases they differentiate between European countries, with France typically being 
evaluated more favourably than the UK, for example.  
Muslim democrats express no profound reservations about interaction with Europe, at least as 
far as economic and technical matters are concerned, although members of Hizbollah evince 
concern that the EU will seek to impose privatisation and other elements of neo-liberal 10 | ROBERT SPRINGBORG 
 
economic policy. MENA Muslim democrats are more cautious about interactions over socio-
cultural and political issues, however, with some expressing their opposition to direct EU 
involvement in democracy promotion, for example. Virtually all moderate Islamists caution the 
EU about interference in the cultural domain, in which they see Islam as playing a vital role. In 
general there appears to be a desire to learn from Europeans in various fields, albeit with 
qualifications about political and cultural matters.  
Muslim democrats are thus quite unlike more radical Islamists, who reject interaction with the 
European Union on principle. The possible rationales underlying the accommodating approach 
of the former are probably driven as much by their present political circumstances as they are by 
their broader philosophical outlooks. Their more moderate views, coupled in many cases with 
direct familiarity with the West and desire to learn more from it, predispose them to want to 
engage. But they must also see direct political benefits from such engagement or they would not 
be such strong supporters of it.  
The benefits in question grow out of their special status as Islamist opposition forces in 
authoritarian political systems. They are seeking legitimacy and recognition, both domestically 
and internationally. In some countries, such as Egypt and the member countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), it is unlawful for them to operate as political parties, whereas in 
others, such as Syria and Tunisia, membership in an Islamist organisation is illegal, in the 
former constituting a capital offence. Only in Turkey, Lebanon and Palestine do they have an 
established presence in government, but even in these comparatively open systems they are 
confronted with politically existential threats. It is not inconceivable, for example, that in the 
wake of a political change they could face severe restrictions or even worse. Elsewhere, the 
existential threats are more real and pressing and the challenges to operating as democratic 
organisations yet more profound. So to protect themselves against autocratic regimes or not 
fully institutionalised democratic or quasi-democratic ones, they need broader recognition and 
the legitimation such recognition provides. Entering into direct dialogue with the EU, even 
informally, provides some measure of that recognition and thus legitimation.  
The content of interaction with the EU might from Islamists’ perspective also be beneficial. 
Material resources, depending on how they were provided, might be welcome. Moderate 
Islamists are well aware that substantial resources flow not only to governments, but also to 
secular oppositionists in the region. To be put on an equal footing with secularists would be of 
substantial symbolic value even if resources were not part of the exchange. Of still greater value 
would be pressure on regimes by the EU to liberalise and democratise, for such measures, if 
successful, would necessarily provide greater political space within which Muslim democrats 
could operate.  
The potential downside for Muslim democrats of substantially enhanced interactions with the 
EU would be threats to their reputation and unity. Their opponents might use such interactions 
to discredit them, as governments have done with other opposition organisations, for example. 
Such criticism could exacerbate internal tensions that might arise over the issue of whether or 
not and how to engage with the EU. Criticism from elements within the broader Islamist 
movement could be anticipated by Muslim democrats unless the terms of such engagement were 
delineated in what was seen to be appropriate fashion. Overall, however, the possible benefits to 
Muslim democrats of engagement considerably outweigh the potential costs. They seem to 
indicate a clear awareness of that as suggested by their manifest desire to engage.  
3.  Muslim Democrats’ comparative views of the EU and US 
Muslim democrats interviewed for this volume differ more in their views of the EU and US than 
they do on matters previously discussed. This seems to reflect their different experiences with 
the EU and US. In Morocco and Turkey, for example, countries where they have a long history 
of engagement with the US, Muslim democrats believe the US to be more interested in them POLITICAL ISLAM AND EUROPE | 11 
 
and their welfare than is the EU. This apparently reflects not only the proactive nature of US 
government policy towards these countries, but more generally it probably also reflects the 
comparative plethora of US-based private or quasi-governmental democracy promotion 
organisations. Europe, by comparison, relies more heavily on governmental actors for 
democracy and human rights promotion. Because those actors are more restricted by 
government policy than are those of civil society, the likelihood is that if Muslim democrats 
have interacted directly with democracy promoters, they will be Americans.  
But the general impression held by Islamists of the US as compared to the EU does not favour 
the former. The EU is seen as being more sympathetic and better informed about the region. US 
policies, such as those towards Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, are roundly condemned, with 
special criticism being levelled at US efforts to isolate Hamas and Hizbollah. In general the 
informants see the EU as being sympathetic but weak in the face of US pressure, whereas they 
see the US as being strong but antagonistic. Almost all urge the EU to adopt policies more 
independent of the US. While one might discount somewhat the comparatively favourable 
assessments of the EU because informants were aware they were talking with individuals who 
were connected to an EU-related project, the fact that those assessments were expressed in such 
fulsome terms and by so many informants indicates that it is not just anticipated reactions by 
informants that underlie them.  
As far as the appropriateness of the two social and political models is concerned, views differ. 
With regards to the former, the treatment of indigenous Muslims is seen as being less 
favourable in Europe than the US. The multiculturalism of the American melting pot is 
contrasted favourably to the ‘uniculturalism’ of most European nation-states. But paradoxically, 
the multicultural model is not held out as being appropriate for the MENA, unless you accept 
the proposition put forward by a member of Turkey’s AKP that his country has been 
multicultural for centuries. Indeed, quite the contrary is the case. Muslim democrats are seeking 
to establish ‘unicultural’ Muslim societies, with special conditions being granted to non-Muslim 
minorities. So while they are highly critical of the treatment of fellow Muslims in EU member 
states and in comparison laud their treatment in the US, they do not even entertain the 
possibility that the American socio-demographic model might be the more appropriate one for 
them to emulate.  
With regards to the comparative attractiveness of political models, the reverse is the case. 
Muslim democrats are more attracted to EU than US models and do see those models as having 
direct relevance for their conditions. This preference seems to reflect various considerations. 
First, some of the informants are not distinguishing between the nature of the political systems 
and the foreign policies they generate. Thus European parliamentary democracies are seen as 
preferable because by and large European policies are seen as being more sympathetic and 
understanding of the MENA countries and of the role of moderate Islamism than is the US. 
Second, the US political system seems to most of the informants to be much more disorderly 
and ‘capitalist’, or at least more penetrated by special interests, than European parliamentary 
democracies. The free-wheeling, bargaining nature of American politics is seen as distasteful. 
Moreover, none of the MENA countries copied US governmental models, as they are all either 
parliamentary democracies of the European variant or are monarchies. So there is no first hand 
familiarity with the American system of balance of powers achieved through separation between 
the three branches of government and led by a President and Congress.  
Finally, underlying the preference for European-style parliamentary democracies might well be 
a broader philosophical concern, which is that the good Muslim polity, hence by extension, any 
good polity, is a united one that does not admit of divisions along the line of particularistic 
interests. The American model of government is founded on the very opposite notion, namely, 
that different interests need to be protected by dividing and counterbalancing governmental 
power. The motor force of American politics is special interests and the channels through which 
power flows are multitudinous and only quasi-institutionalised, thus admitting of endless 12 | ROBERT SPRINGBORG 
 
bargaining and coalition formation. In Europe, by contrast, government is formed by the party 
or parties that capture a majority of seats in parliament, thus the channels of influence are well 
defined and comparatively rigid. The European model, in other words, more closely 
approximates the Muslim ideal, with the ruling party or parties being able to act on behalf of the 
entire policy to a much greater extent than the American counterpart.  
In sum, perceptions of the EU and its member states tend to be more favourable on the grounds 
of both policies and model of government than the US, with the obvious and important 
exception being that of treatment of Muslim minorities. Those Muslim democrats who feel that 
the US has been more forthcoming than the EU seem to be those who have had first hand 
experience in dealing with US officials and private actors involved in democracy and human 
rights promotion, suggesting in turn that dialogue and engagement by Western actors results in 
more positive assessments of them by Islamists. The already comparatively favourable views of 
the EU further suggest that engagement by it, both formally and informally, would have 
immediate and positive impacts on the attitudes towards it held by Muslim democrats.  
4.  Muslim and Western conceptions of democracy and human rights 
The interviews revealed unequivocally that Muslim democrats and most Westerners do not 
share the same weltanschauung when it comes to their understanding of democracy and human 
rights. It is important to emphasise this point because of a prevailing tendency in some circles in 
the West to downplay or even ignore these philosophical differences. Their reaction to Edward 
Said’s critique of Orientalism typically underlies their view and it may in fact be an 
overreaction. Before Said’s pioneering work, differences between ‘the Orient’ and the West 
were commonly seen as being ‘essentialist’ in nature, owing to inherent differences between the 
cultures and, most importantly, religions of the peoples concerned. This extreme view was 
rightly and effectively debunked by Said.  
It has been replaced by an emphasis, and possibly an over-emphasis, on the role of situation in 
determining outlooks. This implies a plasticity of beliefs that may be excessive, as suggested by 
Muslim democrats’ reflections on democracy and human rights as recorded in this volume. 
Virtually all of the interviewees draw sharp distinctions between Islamic and Western 
conceptions of representative government and protection of individual rights and freedoms. Yet 
it is also clear from available polling data that experience with democracy is the most important 
single factor in explaining Muslim’s attitudes about that system of government.
2  In short, it is 
important to recognise that both ‘essence’ and ‘situation’ condition politically relevant beliefs. It 
is therefore reasonable to conclude that when grounded in other systems of thought and practice, 
such as religion, and reinforced by well-structured organisations, these political beliefs are 
unlikely to change dramatically as a result of intermittent engagement with outside actors, 
although they may undergo some modification. This is not to suggest, however, that enhanced 
mutual awareness is of no value, for it clearly is. It is to suggest though that expectations of 
changes of values, beliefs and behaviour as a result of engagement should not be excessive. 
With regards to the content of views on democracy and human rights, the relevant difference in 
philosophical orientations of Westerners and Muslim democrats is that the former believe in 
universal norms, whereas the latter do not. The Islamist view is that the West is seeking to 
portray its own notions and practices of human rights and democracy as universal in nature. 
Instead, they contend, these conceptions of human rights and democracy reflect the particular 
cultures and histories of European nations. They are not relevant for all peoples at all times, 
especially for Muslims, who have their own religious, cultural and historical bases for human 
rights, political freedoms and democratic practices. The moderate Islamists interviewed noted 
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the excessive ‘individualism’ of European ideas, arguing that conceptions of human rights and 
democracy founded on individualism had no resonance in Islam, in which social obligations and 
solidarities are of greater importance. Western liberal values that prioritise individual freedom 
over community rights are, in short, seen as being un- or anti-Islamic. Finally, the elevation of 
human over divine wisdom, a concept which lies at the heart of Western representative 
institutions and legal systems, is also seen as being antithetical to Islam.   
These profound philosophical differences underlie disagreements over specific policies, which 
in turn tend to become highly emotive, symbolic issues for both sides. Competing views of 
appropriate gender roles and relations are possibly the most critical of these symbolic issues. 
Muslim democrats deeply resent what they see as an attempt by Europe to impose its own 
preferences for gender relations, a step which they view as neo-imperialist, rather than reflecting 
the application of so-called universal norms. So the wearing of head scarves, the recognition of 
equal rights for women and the treatment of homosexuality are issues about which Muslim 
democrats and most Europeans have profoundly different views that will be difficult to 
reconcile, no matter how long and intense the dialogue over them. But it is nevertheless 
important to recognise that enhanced awareness of other perspectives, even if they are not 
shared, is a potential benefit of dialogue.  
5.  Additional issues that might be addressed 
The approach utilised in this volume of interviewing moderate Islamists might fruitfully be 
extended to some other, relevant issues. Possibly the most interesting, directly relevant issue 
that could also be included is that of connectivity in the region in general and that between 
Muslim democrats specifically. Indeed, the research already undertaken and reported upon 
revealed that reactions to specific events in the region, such as the Lebanese war of 2006, may 
be of profound significance. It is clear from existing evidence that Muslim democrats, as well 
presumably as most residents of the region, are closely attuned to events not only in their 
country, but in the region as a whole. These are not hermetically sealed political systems. Indeed, 
the Middle East is more of a region than possibly any other in the developing world in the sense 
that political events in one part of it quickly impact other sub-regions and countries within it. 
Shared language, culture and history contribute to the strongly systemic nature of the MENA, a 
strength now reinforced and reflected politically by the ubiquitous nature of Islamism. It would 
of course be useful to assess more systematically how regional events impact the perceptions 
and actions of Muslim democrats and to determine if they are yet more attuned to those events 
than are their compatriots of different political persuasions. 
Possible connections between Muslim democrats in different countries were not directly 
investigated. The degree to which they interact, learn from one another, and provide tangible 
and intangible resources is an important, yet largely unknown aspect of moderate Islamism. 
Intensive research which has been conducted on connections has focused on those among 
radical Islamists. There is nevertheless evidence that Iranian support has been vital for the 
creation and continued effectiveness of Hizbollah. Similarly, arguments have been made that 
Saudi support for Egyptian Muslim Brothers and, by extension, moderate Islamists throughout 
the Arab world, has been a key factor in their success. So while there has been some research on 
connections between radical Islamists and considerable speculation on the role of Saudi Arabia, 
in particular in supporting both mujahidin in Afghanistan and moderate Arab Islamists 
elsewhere, little is known in detail, particularly about the latter, to say nothing about direct 
dealings between moderate Islamists in the various countries. The Turkish case is being 
followed closely by Arab Muslim democrats, but whether that is simply a monitoring exercise 
or consists of more direct engagement is unknown. Precisely because there are good reasons to 
believe that there may be extensive interactions between moderate Islamists and that those 
interactions may have significant impacts, it is important that this aspect of connectivity be 
more thoroughly investigated. Indeed, if the EU is to adopt a policy of more extensive and 14 | ROBERT SPRINGBORG 
 
intensive engagement with moderate Islamists, it would want to consider the relevance of such 
regional connections to its dealings with moderate Islamists on a country by country basis. 
The other major issue that remains largely unaddressed is what Muslim democrats do when they 
exercise political power. Of course there is little empirical evidence to report, for it is only 
Turkey, Palestine, and Lebanon where they are currently in government in greater or lesser 
measure. The two cabinet portfolios (health and education) the Jordanian Islamic Action Front 
was briefly awarded in the wake of the 1989 elections hardly qualify. 
Yet this question is vital to understanding the political nature of moderate Islamism. The 
allegation that Muslim democrats have an opportunistic rather than abiding commitment to 
democracy is widespread. The fear that they would seek to impose a draconian, thoroughgoing 
Islamicisation once they had sufficient power to do so is shared by secularists everywhere in the 
MENA. The Turkish case has not provided much comfort to those with such doubts, precisely 
because in Turkey the AKP is confronted with the countervailing power not only of the military, 
but also by the reasonably well institutionalised legal/judicial system and by firmly held public 
opinion, buttressed by a comparatively well-developed civil society. Thus the AKP’s capacity to 
impose Islamicisation is limited, whatever its will might be. 
The same may well not apply in Arab countries. Military traditions are not those of nation-
guarding, Kemalist secularism. Courts are not independent of the executive and public opinion 
is comparatively diffuse and poorly aggregated within civil society. Moreover, in opposition, 
Muslim democrats, such as the MB in Egypt and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, have been 
vociferous in their criticism of manifestations of secular, ‘global’ culture and adamant in 
insisting upon censorship, prohibition of alcohol, imposition of dress and behaviour codes, 
revision of school curricula and the like. The question can rightly be raised that if this is what 
they are like in opposition, what would they do once in power? Alas, the track record is too 
short for a definitive answer to be given, but a more thorough search of the existing evidence 
might provide more informed assessments.
3 
A related area of ambiguity is what Muslim democrats think about the relationship between the 
state and the exercise of power. At a theoretical level it can be argued that since Islam 
encompasses both din wa dawlah, or religion and state, the latter is the instrument of the former, 
being responsible for implementation of Islamic precepts in society. In this view Muslim 
democrats are focused on achieving political power so that they can utilise the state to 
implement Islam as they conceive it.  
At the level of practice, however, recent social and economic history suggests a somewhat 
different approach. Authoritarian states in the MENA have been inhospitable to moderate 
Islamists, so they have set about constructing parallel structures in civil society. This is true in 
the economic realm, where various forms of Islamist finance and business have sprouted and 
multiplied, as well as in service delivery, where a rich array of Islamist NGOs have set down 
roots as they have provided health, educational, sanitation, transport and other facilities. Many 
of those involved in these economic and social activities have become highly sceptical not only 
of the authoritarian, semi-secular states under which they live, but presumably also of the notion 
that the state should be the repository of all political, hence also all economic and social power. 
So it is important to know not just what Islamic doctrine says about the state, but what Muslim 
democrats think its appropriate role should be. What limits should be imposed upon its reach? 
What relationship should it have to the economy and to private providers of social services? 
                                                      
3 A recent effort to evaluate whether participation by Islamists in the political systems of Jordan and 
Yemen induced moderation revealed that in the former it did, but not in the latter. Both the nature of the 
Islamist movement and aspects of the broader political system in which it operates appear to determine 
whether inclusion will or will not induce moderation. See Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation. 
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What should the mechanisms be that protect individuals against possible excesses of the state? 
In sum, this is a potentially rich and important area for investigation and one that is very 
relevant to relations between Muslim democrats and external actors, including the EU.  
6.  A preliminary cost/benefit analysis of engaging with Muslim 
Democrats 
A thorough cost/benefit analysis from a Western perspective of engaging with Muslim 
democrats would require clear parameters defining that engagement, including answering such 
questions as with exactly whom, over what topics, in what settings and so on. Prior to that 
undertaking all that can be done is to suggest some possible costs and benefits in general terms. 
As far as the former are concerned, chief among them might well be the risks of not engaging. 
The evolution of moderate forms of political Islam could serve to alleviate problems arising 
from ethnic and sectarian divisions, undercut support for violent Islamist movements, and 
strengthen connections between economic and political elites and the grass roots of civil society. 
In the absence of Muslim democrats taking on these challenges, it is hard to envision what other 
resources are available to address these problems, which if they are not tackled, will intensify. 
Engagement might also contribute to rendering authoritarian regimes more susceptible to 
reforms, while challenging the systems of corruption and patronage politics that underlie them. 
A careful engagement could also serve as a means for drawing important parts of MENA 
societies into a discussion with Europe and North America about the complex practical and 
philosophical issues of governing societies in democratic, accountable and effective ways, while 
also respecting the rule of law and human rights. Although engaging Muslim democrats is 
unlikely to solve all the political problems of the region, a thoughtful and careful engagement 
could clearly be a part of encouraging reform and political evolution in the region in directions 
that the EU would welcome. While this is clearly a long term project, it may represent one of 
the best uses of ‘soft power’ in the region.  
There are also potential costs to engagement. It is unlikely to bring about coincidence of views 
and there is a possibility, if not carefully managed, that it could exacerbate differences and 
increase tensions. At the more directly political level, engagement may enhance the resources of 
moderate Islamists at the expense of other political actors who might in fact be more natural 
allies of the West. As mentioned above, engagement would necessarily provide some measure 
of legitimacy to moderate Islamists, which is a valuable gain for them in its own right, as 
authoritarian regimes are seeking to deny them this legitimacy.  
But EU engagement might also contribute to a shift in the balance of power within political 
oppositions away from secularists and towards Muslim democrats. The former are in virtually 
all of the countries under consideration politically less well-organised, as evidenced by their 
weak electoral performances compared to the Muslim democrats, not only in national elections, 
but in elections in syndicates, student bodies, chambers of commerce, and indeed virtually in 
any setting in which elections are conducted. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
moderate Islamists outnumber secularists. In addition to the organisational factor, which favours 
Islamists, is the fact that Islamist political parties and movements are seen as posing the only 
viable alternative to incumbent governments, hence are the recipients of protest votes by those 
who do not necessarily endorse their Islamist platforms. Finally, actual voting results that have 
been referred to as proof of the political predominance of Muslim democrats are not as 
conclusive as such claims suggest. In Palestine, for example, Hamas won about 40% of the 
popular vote in the January 2006 election, just slightly more than Fatah. But the electoral system 
converted that plurality into a substantial parliamentary majority, much to the surprise of even 
Hamas and Fatah operatives. Hizbollah’s share of the Lebanese vote is of course kept small by 
virtue of the fact that it appeals virtually exclusively to the Shi`a community. It is also the case, 
however, that substantial numbers of Shi`a do not vote for Hizbollah, preferring instead to vote 16 | ROBERT SPRINGBORG 
 
for the secularly inclined Amal party, or for traditional notables who eschew Islamism or any 
other ideology, for that matter.  
It is thus important not to think of moderate Islamism as constituting a political wave that is 
sweeping all before it. It is of large and probably still growing importance, but its support level 
in the population may well be lower than is typically projected by election results, even though 
governments have in many instances sought to discourage votes for moderate Islamist 
candidates. Secularists are not a small minority in any of these systems and may in fact 
constitute silent majorities in most. It is important, therefore, not to write them off as political 
dinosaurs on the verge of extinction in the MENA. That could happen, but it is not pre-ordained. 
To the extent dialogue influences the balance of power between moderate Islamists and 
secularists, it needs to be evaluated from that perspective.  
7. Recommendations 
Probably of greatest importance is the need to clarify what the EU is seeking from engagement 
with Muslim democrats. While information exchange and general dialogue serve the purposes 
of increasing mutual familiarity and probably reducing misunderstandings and associated 
tensions, these are not truly strategic objectives. The one such objective that stands out is to help 
facilitate the transition to pluralist democracy through gradual incorporation of democrats, 
including Muslim democrats, into their respective political systems. This will require various 
compromises and changes by virtually all actors within these political systems, and those in turn 
will take time and possibly support by outside parties, including the EU. The systems 
themselves are also in need of change, for they are structurally inhospitable to democrats. They 
have been built around the principle of expediting the unfettered exercise of centralised 
executive power and hence have an absence of checks and balances and alternative sources and 
centres of power. Thus the transition to pluralism under the rule of law requires the democratic 
development of both actors and institutions and it is that development that should provide the 
focus for engagement not only with Muslim democrats, but other actors and institutions within 
these systems. 
A related consideration is that despite Muslim democrats’ rejection of the concept of interest 
representation, unless and until that feature develops a truly pluralist democracy will not emerge. 
At present the relationship between political organisations, including parties and broader 
movements, on the one hand, and specific interests, whether economic, regional, ethnic or 
whatever, on the other, is weak to non-existent. Authoritarian governments have systematically 
sought to prevent the emergence of such linkages. They have built patronage parties as 
alternatives to interest-based ones. And the political societies in question have not had long 
histories of organised political representation of specific interests, as opposed to political 
leadership by notables of various types. Thus a major transition in the concept of representation 
is necessary if mature, stable democracies are to emerge in the MENA region. This transition 
can only happen once competitive, democratic politics begin to take root and provide the 
opportunities for that competition to facilitate the emergence of interest representation. It is in 
the intervening period that Muslim democrats are likely to be powerful actors within these 
political systems. It should not be assumed that their prospects will be enhanced by the 
institutionalisation of pluralism. As presently constructed the organisations of Muslim 
democrats are more akin to broad protest movements and service providers than to interest-
based political parties. They are thus appropriate for this particular historical circumstance, but 
not necessarily for the one that hopefully will follow. It is thus important that those involved in 
engagement appreciate the historical circumstances that have given rise to the popularity of 
Muslim democracy and also realise that those circumstances are not likely to persist forever.  
A third recommendation is for engagement to be concerned primarily with the practical, not the 
philosophical. As discussed above, there are clear and profound philosophical differences POLITICAL ISLAM AND EUROPE | 17 
 
between Europeans and Muslim democrats and those differences are unlikely to be resolved 
soon or through any imaginable sort of dialogue that could occur. Divergent views on many key 
issues, including human rights and especially gender relations, are embedded in these different 
philosophies. That does not mean, however, that compromise on the handling of these issues 
cannot be reached until the underlying philosophical differences are dealt with. Indeed, quite the 
opposite is the case, for the more the root causes of these differences are explored, the less easy 
will it be to reach compromise at a practical level. The search for common ground in resolving 
practical issues might be assisted by a general awareness of the philosophical orientations of 
both parties, but it could be severely impeded were the search to enhance that awareness or to 
turn into exercises in self-justification. Possibly the best reconciliation of this potential dilemma 
is to separate the two discussions, so that those with immediate policy relevance are isolated 
from engagement over philosophical issues, which can occur on a separate track.  
A related recommendation is that engagement should be concerned with institutions and the 
nurturing of professionalism associated with the growth of both personal and institutional 
loyalties and capacities. The MENA is an area of strong societies and weak states, meaning that 
informal associational ties, such as those of kinship, region or sect, typically command greater 
loyalty than do ties to formal institutions. Mature democracy depends upon the effective 
functioning of such institutions, whether they are of government itself or in civil society. It is 
thus vital for the long term prospects for MENA democracy that such institutions, and loyalties 
to them, are strengthened. In the short term they also serve as valuable conduits through which 
democratisation assistance can reach wide audiences, including Muslim democrats. Assistance 
provided to parliaments, for example, is of at least indirect and frequently direct benefit to 
parliamentary delegations of Muslim democrats. Providing such assistance through institutions 
avoids the necessity of picking individual beneficiaries and also serves to cement linkages 
between civil society actors and state institutions. Thus to the extent engagement with Muslim 
democrats can simultaneously serve to strengthen their commitments to institutions and the 
institutions themselves, it will maximise its impacts. 
Finally, the evidence presented in this volume points to the need for the EU to clarify its 
policies towards the MENA and, specifically Muslim democrats within it, as well as to 
communicate those policies to non-governmental audiences, including to Muslim democrats. 
The present situation is one in which lack of knowledge of EU policies, combined with the 
actual lack of EU policies towards engaging with moderate Islamists, cause Muslim democrats 
to at best be curious about the EU and at worse to be suspicious of it. Engagement might itself 
help to contribute to policy formation in this important area, while also serving as a vehicle to 
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Political Islam and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
Workshop Organized by CEPS, Fundación Tres Culturas and FRIDE 
Seville, 24-25 November 2006 
 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) the Fundación Tres Culturas and the Fundación 
para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) are embarking on a project to 
strengthen the understanding of Islamist parties’ perspectives on concrete and specific areas of 
European policy. Most work on political Islam has remained focused on relatively abstract 
questions, while it is widely agreed that the focus of enquiry needs to be more practical, with a 
view to understanding more about Islamist parties’ policy goals and aspirations. The core aims 
of this project are to link more general debates over political Islam specifically to the content of 
European policy in the region and to develop coherent policies to relate to these parties. CEPS 
the Fundación Tres Culturas and FRIDE are organising a workshop in Seville on 24-25 
November 2006 in order to initiate the first phase of this project. This first workshop will 
involve analysts and experts, not themselves directly politically active, but known to have a 
certain orientation towards and access to Islamist parties. 
 
In recent years an enormous amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue 
of political Islam. It is widely agreed that it is desirable and indeed necessary to engage with 
moderate Islamist parties to a greater extent than hitherto. Yet uncertainty remains at both the 
conceptual and policy-making levels over how to do this. This issue needs to be addressed more 
systematically with greater urgency. In most southern Mediterranean Arab states Islamist parties 
are enjoying increasing support. This has been witnessed in recent months in particular in Egypt, 
Algeria, Morocco and the Palestinian Territories, while the prohibition of Islamist parties in 
Syria and Libya threatens to become an increasingly divisive issue. There should be an 
engagement with moderate Islamist parties and organisations that are currently enjoying a rise 
in support. For the moment it seems that there has been hardly any engagement even in less 
politicised areas at the grassroots level, as proposed by many analysts.  
 
Given the more pragmatic approach recently adopted by many of the moderate Islamist 
movements, it is a propitious time to take advantage of their relative openness towards engaging 
Western countries more openly by reaching out to them and establishing strategic links. 
Additionally, what should be done in terms of dealing with the less moderate Islamists who 
have political branches, but yet have not officially renounced violence, especially in light of 
Hamas’s recent legislative victory? What of secular-religious national alliances?  
 
The workshop will lead to the publication of a book collecting all the findings from research in 
the field and the conclusions derived from discussions at the workshop.  For this purpose the 
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15:30-16:00  Introduction and Overview:  
    State of the Art in the Analysis of Political Islam and the West 
Richard Youngs, FRIDE  
Michael Emerson, CEPS 
 
16:00-18:00  Case Studies 1-3: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia 
Samir Amghar, Algeria 
Amel Boubekeur, Morocco 
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Discussant: Mohamed Ennaji, Tres Culturas, Morocco 
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9:00-11.00  Case Studies 4-6: Egypt, Lebanon, Syria 
  Emad  Shahin,  Egypt 
  Talal  Atrissi,  Lebanon 
  Salam  Kawakabi,  Syria 
  Discussant : Nathalie Tocci, IAI, Rome   
 
11:00-11:30  Coffee Break 
 
11.30-13:30  Case Studies 7-9: Turkey, Palestine, Jordan 
  Senem Aydin, Turkey 
Mustafa Abu Sway, Palestine 
Mohamed al Masri, Jordan 
Discussant: Abdeslam  Maghraoui, USIP 
 
 13:30-15:30  Lunch Break 
15:30- 17:00  Conclusions and Wrap Up 
 Robert Springborg, SOAS, London 
Discussant: Neil Melvin, SIPRI 
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Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the 
most experienced and authoritative think 
tanks operating in the European Union today. 
CEPS serves as a leading forum for debate on 
EU affairs, but its most distinguishing feature 
lies in its strong in-house research capacity, 
complemented by an extensive network of 
partner institutes throughout the world.
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policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
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•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	a	
regular	flow	of	publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Formation	of	nine	different	research	networks,	
comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.